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Abstract
This paper focuses is on the potential role that taxation and public expenditure policies play in gener
al in affecting income distribution. We find that progressive personal income taxes and corporate income taxes reduce income inequality. However, the effect of corporate income taxes seems to be erod
ed away in open or globalized economies. We also find that general consumption taxes, excise taxes
and customs duties have a negative impact on income distribution. On the expenditure side, we find
that higher shares of GDP on social welfare, education, health and housing public expenditures have a
positive impact on income distribution.
Keywords: Tax Policy, Public Expenditures, Income Distribution, Tax Progressivity.
JEL classification: H23, H24, H51, H52, H53, H54.

1. Introduction
The last two decades have seen a general deterioration of income distribution in most
countries around the world and, even though the most recent data are not yet all available,
all indications are that inequality has increased as a consequence of the 2009 global crisis
and the following recession 1. And unlike earlier crises of a global scale, this most recent one
may have a much more significant impact on the income distribution in OECD countries
(Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). A variety of economic factors, such as increased global
ization, corruption and other institutional failures, or demographic trends have been used to
attempt to explain the forces driving larger inequalities in market incomes. The main focus
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of this paper is on the potential role that taxation and public expenditure policies play in af
fecting income distribution, positively or negatively, and to what extent changes in fiscal
policies on the tax and expenditure sides of the budget around the world have contributed to
slow down and ongoing deterioration of income distribution patterns- or alternatively, they
have been conducive to such deterioration.
Over the last several decades there have been changes in the rates and structure of tax
systems, as well as important variation in the level and composition of public expenditures
in both developed and developing countries. Our current knowledge of how taxes, transfers
and public expenditure programs may affect income distribution has significantly improved
on a country by country basis because of all the research effort that has been put in the tax
and expenditure incidence literature 2. Much less research has been conducted on how
changes in taxation and public spending trends have actually impacted income distribution,
especially in developing countries. However, some evidence indicates that fiscal policies do
affect income distribution. For example, Caminada and Goudwaard (2001) found that in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, reductions in government spending in social programs
making the welfare systems in those countries less generous have been accompanied by
sharp increases in income inequality, although the causality has not been proven. Similar
powerful effects have been attributed to fiscal policies in developing countries, such in the
cases of Indonesia (Keuning and Thorbecke, 1989) or Latin America (Ocampo, 1998). On
the other hand, some other authors have found a weak correlation between changes in gov
ernment spending and income inequality (Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2005; Arjona, Ladaique
and Pearson, 2001) or have claimed a general ineffectiveness of tax policy to affect income
distribution (Harberger, 2006).
Clearly, there is at this point a need to better understand what role tax and spending poli
cies have been playing vis-à-vis the changing trends in inequality. Does the degree of effec
tive tax progressivity play a role in improving income distribution? Does an increased share
of revenues from VAT worsen income distribution? Are recent trends in expenditure policies
offsetting or reinforcing the effects of changes of taxation? These are some of the questions
we analyze in depth in this paper using a large panel data set of developed and developing
countries covering the period 1970-2009. The challenges we face are significant; not only it
is difficult to come up with good measures of changes in income distribution comparable
across countries but also it becomes quite difficult to identify and measure the most salient as
pects of tax and expenditure policies as they are expected to impact income distribution.
Despite those difficulties, in our empirical analysis we find significant effects of both
taxes and public spending on income distribution when they are considered jointly. These ef
fects generally support the findings in individual country incidence analysis studies. Progres
sive income taxes, when considered separately, have a positive impact on income distribu
tion, contributing to decreasing inequality, and this effect is more pronounced the higher the
degree of progressivity and the higher the share of GDP that is collected with the individual
income tax. Corporate income taxes also have a positive effect on income distribution but
this effect seems to be eroded away in economies that are very opened or globalized, thus
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supporting Harberger’s (1998) reinterpretation of the incidence of the corporate tax in open,
as opposed to closed, economies. We also find, in accordance with individual country inci
dence analysis studies, that general consumption taxes, excise taxes and customs duties have
a negative impact on income distribution, with some caveats depending on the specific type
of tax being considered.
On the expenditure side, we find that higher shares of GDP on social welfare, education,
health and housing public expenditures have a positive impact on income distribution, indi
vidually and collectively. In terms of the magnitude of the impact, the effects of taxes on income distribution changes tend to be of an equivalent scale to those for public expenditures.
This is not necessarily consistent with the existing conventional wisdom of the higher abili
ty of governments to pursue redistributional policies from the expenditure side of the budg
et as opposed to tax policy side. However, this is probably reflecting the fact that other pub
lic expenditures which are expected to affect positively income distribution are not included
in the analysis mainly due to data limitation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we take a preliminary look
at the data looking at the trends in income distribution, taxes and selected public expendi
tures for our sample of 150 countries for 1970 to 2009. In section 3 we review the litera
ture, putting especial focus on regression based studies of the impact of fiscal policies on
income distribution. In section 4 we develop our empirical approach, with the different
specification models and a discussion of the several econometric challenges we face. In
section 5 we discuss the data. In section 6 we present our empirical findings. Section 7
concludes.

2. Trends on Income Distribution and Tax and Expenditure Policies
The last three and a half decades have seen considerable variation in the levels of in
equality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average
Gini coefficient for our entire sample of countries, which is calculated in three different
forms: unweighted, weighted by country GDP, and weighted by country population 3. Al
though the evolution of the three indexes varies somewhat, especially in the most recent
years, two clear trends are apparent in worldwide income inequality. From the earlier 1970s
to the middle of the 1980s income inequality decreased by all measures and at rapid pace.
After stabilizing in the middle 1980s, inequality rose sharply especially in the early 1990s.
Both unweighted and weighted by GDP, Ginis showed declines in the early 2000s al
though the population weighted Gini continued to increase. We would expect all inequality
measures to show increases after the world crisis of 2009 but those data are not yet available
for a large number of countries.
When looking at individual taxes, the overall personal income tax progressivity index 4
has shown a pretty steady decreasing trend over the past 25 years (Figure 2).
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Figure 1. Trends in Income Inequality as Measured by Gini Coefficients, 1970-2006
Source: Authors’ calculations; World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008.

Figure 2. Trends in Personal Income Tax Progressivity (unweighted Gini)
and Income Inequality, 1980-2005
Source: Authors’ calculations; Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick and Duncan, 2010; World Income Inequality
Database V2.0c May 2008.

Thus, from just a general look at the data, there does not appear to be a major connec
tion with inequality and personal income tax progressivity. However, the trends for the
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different taxes measured as “collections as % of GDP” shown in Figure 3 indicate that
there is perhaps a closer general correlation between tax policy and the trend in income in
equality.

Figure 3. Trends in Taxation (as % of GDP raised with each tax) 1972-2009
Source: Authors’ calculations; IMF GFS Database; OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL.

We can see there were significant increases in average tax collections worldwide in ‘so
cial security contributions” plus payroll taxes and general consumption taxes (VAT), two
taxes that are generally thought to be regressive, for over the 25 year period 5. The increas
es are specially pronounced since the late 1980s. In addition, also from the late 1980s we can
observe a significant decrease in the importance of personal income tax, the tax that is gen
erally accepted to have the largest potential to redistribute income. Any impact of the decline
in personal income taxes should have come to reinforce the impact of the general decline in
the progressivity index we saw in Figure 2; that is, not only did the personal income tax become less important in terms of collections but also it became less progressive. For other
taxes, we can also see in Figure 3 a long declining trend over the entire period, but especial
ly so since the early 1990s in customs duties. This tax is generally thought as having a re
gressive incidence, so the smaller collections in customs duties should have helped reduce
income inequality; but, we also must note that this tax is much smaller in terms of GDP than,
for example, social security contributions or general consumption taxes. In the case of the
corporate income tax, collections as a share of GDP have experienced a rollercoaster ride for
the last 25 years, with an increasing swing since the early 1990. This is a tax that is gener
ally thought to be progressive, although less so, and can be even regressive the higher the
degree of openness of the economy; also, this tax is of relative less importance in terms of
collections. Last, excise taxes have also been on a bit of a rollercoaster and in the upswing
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since the early 1990s. Like in the case of general consumption taxes, excises are generally
thought to have a regressive incidence. However, their effect varies per country depending
on whether or not they are applied to luxury or basic items for the population, and on the
consumption preferences of citizens.
As we discuss immediately below in the review of the literature, while taxes are gener
ally thought to have a limited impact on income distribution, public expenditures are gener
ally thought to have larger potential to affect it. In this paper, we particularly focus on four
categories of public expenditures that have a priori significant potential on reducing inequal
ity in the distribution of income: public expenditures on social protection, education, health,
and housing, all expressed as “% of GDP”. The worldwide trends in these expenditure cate
gories are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Trends in Public Spending (as % of GDP spent for each category), 1972-2009
Source: Authors’ calculations; IMF GFS Database, OECD Social Expenditure Database; International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

The potentially redistributive expenditures on “social protection” have increased steadi
ly since the early 1980s reaching a peak in the early 2000s and then declining slightly in the
most recent years. Public expenditures on health also have steadily increased since the
1980s reaching a plateau and then declining slightly in more recent years. On the other hand,
public expenditures on education have decreased significantly since the end of the 1980s.
Depending on the composition and access of lower income groups to education and health
services (for example, primary health which tends to be progressive especially when there is
access in poor rural areas versus tertiary hospital services which tends to be regressive) they
can also significantly affect inequality in the distribution of income. Since expenditures on
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public health increased during the period, this should have contributed to decreasing inequal
ity. And because public education expenditures decreased, this should have contributed to
increasing income inequality. However, the effects of both health and education expendi
tures on income distribution depend intrinsically on the intra-sectoral composition of spend
ing in both sectors and the degree of access of the poorest segments of the population to the
public services provided. For example, it is expected that primary education benefits the
poor, provided they can access it and its quality is good, while tertiary education may bene
fit more the richer segments of society. Similarly accessible primary medical care is expect
ed to benefit the poor relatively more while advance medical care may often be affordable
only to richer groups. The fourth category of public expenditures on housing has steadily
declined since the mid-1980s with potentially negative effect on income distribution.
Clearly, the discussion above can only be taken as indicative and suggestive of the di
rections in which tax and public expenditure policies may be correlated with the trends on
income inequality. The overall picture would seem to be that the worldwide trends in tax pol
icy have not been conducive to reducing income inequality but, if anything, to increase it.
Higher overall reliance on regressive indirect and payroll taxes and a reduced importance
and degree of progressivity of personal income taxes tells the story. On the expenditure side,
the decline in public housing expenditures but more importantly in education expenditures
points toward a negative impact increasing income inequality, while the increased expendi
tures on social protection services and public health could have had offsetting effects, con
tributing to reducing inequality. Only careful econometric analysis can help us establish to
what extent the increases in public expenditures on health and social protection may have
offset those trends and overall helped improve equality in the distribution of income. The
econometric analysis is presented in section 4.

3. Review of the literature
Taxes and income distribution
The interest in the impact of tax structure on income distribution dates back to Meltzer
and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that when mean income rises relative to the median income
in the income distribution, a majority coalition of those with lower income will tend to sup
port higher taxes, presumably more in the form of direct, and progressive, taxes as opposed
to indirect taxes 6. There is a fairly large applied literature on tax incidence, allocating tax
burdens among different income groups according to a conventional set of assumptions
about tax shifting. These assumptions in the conventional tax incidence literature include the
following: (i) the individual income tax is typically assumed to be progressive; (ii) payroll
and social security taxes are typically assumed to be fully shifted to workers and regressive
due to the cap on income to structure contributions; (iii) the corporate income tax is typical
ly assumed to be paid by capital owners and therefore progressive, but less so in open
economies where the tax gets shifted to immobile factors, mainly labor; (iv) taxes on goods
and services, including several forms of sales taxes, value-added taxes, excise taxes, and also
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customs duties are practically all the time assumed to be shifted forward to consumers, i.e.
they are assumed to be regressive, although the exemption and lower rates for basic com
modities can reduce the regressivity of value added taxes and excise taxes on luxury items
can be highly progressive.
In his seminal paper on incidence of corporate income tax, Harberger (1962) shows that
in a closed-economy with two perfectly competitive sectors and fully mobile factors of pro
duction, imposing a tax on capital in one sector would cause capital to move from the taxed
to the untaxed sector, further causing reallocation of labor among two sectors and changes
in factor and output prices. Using elasticities typical for the U.S. economy, Harberger finds
that, in these circumstances, capital bears approximately the full burden of the corporate income tax. In his two more recent papers, Harberger (1995, 2006) revisits the incidence of
CIT in an open economy where capital can flow freely across the international borders and
finds that, in this case, the burden of a corporate tax is more than fully shifted to labor. To
account for this dimension of CIT, we interact CIT variable with a globalization index. Our
results provide support for Harberger’s (1995, 2006) findings. In a closed economy, one per
centage point increase in share of CIT to GDP reduces income inequality by 0.7 percentage
points. However, the more open an economy is, the lower is this negative effect on income
inequality – 10 points increase in the globalization index reduces negative effect of CIT on
income inequality by 0.1 percentage points.
Most of the empirical studies on tax incidence are country-specific studies relying on
microsimulation models and computable general equilibrium models. The general conclu
sion reached in this literature is that the redistributive effects of taxes are weak, especially
so for developing countries (Bird and Zolt, 2005; Harberger, 2006; and Martinez-Vazquez,
2008). However, some of these papers have found significant effects for large changes in
tax structure. For example, for the United States, Li and Sarte (2004) find that the progres
sivity change associated with the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 had a significant effect on
income inequality decreasing the Gini coefficient in four percentage points. See also Grav
elle (1992).
There has been less empirical work on the impact of the tax structure on the distribution
of income across countries. Weller (2007) uses cross-country data from 1981 to 2002 and
finds positive effects of progressive taxation on income distribution. More recently, Duncan
and Sabirianova Peter (2008) use a sophisticated measure of progressivity 7 to examine
whether inequality in the distribution of income is affected by their measure of structural
progressivity of national income tax systems. Their main finding is that while progressivity
reduces observed inequality in reported gross and net income, as measured by the Gini co
efficients based on those data, it has a significantly smaller impact on “true inequality”,
which they argue is approximated by consumption-based measures of the Gini coefficient 8.
However, Duncan and Peter (2008) do not take into account the fact that the impact of pro
gressivity on income distribution also depends on the relative importance in GDP of income
tax revenues; highly progressive income taxes but with relatively small collections are like
ly to have less of an impact on income distribution.
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Public spending and income distribution
The oldest literature that ties public spending, growth and income distribution is on the
Kuznet’s (1955) hypothesis on the existence of an inverted U-curve relationship between
economic growth and the distribution of income, mainly stating that growth of national income is initially accompanied by increased inequality before the fruits of growth gets more
equitably divided in society. However, the hypothesis is vague with respect to the duration
of the period during which income distribution should become more skewed nor is explicit
about any role that public spending may play in this process. The Kuznet’s hypothesis has
been tested and researched for a good number of decades with, at best, mixed results 9.
More recent research on public expenditure and income distribution has been concerned
with the effectiveness of government policy in improving or at least mitigating the worsening
of income distribution. Independently of whether Kuznet’s hypothesis holds in its entirety or
not, there has been an increasing consensus that economic growth per se may not be sufficient
to reduce inequalities already present in the income distribution. As Tanzi and Chu (1992)
have argued, without any redistributive government policy, even though very large growth
rates can fail to achieve any significant reduction in poverty rates and income inequality.
Government policies, specifically expenditure policies, can bear heavily upon the qualita
tive results of economic growth. It has been also increasingly acknowledged that the nature of
economic growth can have discernible impacts in the distribution of income. In particular, con
trary to the traditional economic argument that explicit redistributive policies can hamper eco
nomic efficiency and growth 10, it is now widely recognized that redistribution policies, such as
human capital development amongst the poor, actually foster growth 11.
However, there has been also wide acknowledgement, going as far as Tanzi (1974), that
what in many instances would seemingly be perceived as redistributive government spend
ing may do nothing to improve income inequality and may actually worsen it. This is due to
the issue of the difficulty of targeting of distributional expenditure policies which has been
discussed by a number of authors (Aspe and Sigmund, 1984; Aspe, 1993; Birdsall and
James, 1993; Gonzalez, 1995; Harberger, 1998; Schwartz and Ter-Minassian, 2000). It is
quite difficult to target the poor with regular education and health spending because, among
other reasons, these programs are in many countries located in urban areas thus not directly
benefiting the rural poor or even those in the informal settlements in urban areas. Beyond the
inherent problems of designing effective redistributive public expenditure programs, other
authors have emphasized the role of political economy, and in particular the political clout
of certain groups, in effectively controlling the amount of redistribution that actually takes
place in any country (Hausmann and Rigobon, 1993; Alesina, 1998).
Of course, it is to be expected that the quality of targeting makes a big difference in the
final outcome. In spite of the caveats above, many education and health spending programs
have been found to be equalizing and ‘poverty reducing’ (Paternostro et al., 2007). Others
have found that infrastructure spending in some developing countries has resulted in large
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poverty reduction (for example, Klump and Bonschab, 2004 in the case of Vietnam) but their
effects on inequality are unknown 12.
In the recent literature much more emphasis has been placed on the relationships be
tween growth and income distribution (Dollar and Kraay, 2000), and public spending and
growth (Afonso, 2005; Herrera, 2007; Moreno-Dodson, 2008; Bayraktar and Moreno-Dod
son, 2010; Day, 2011). It is now quite clear that the quantity and quality of growth is affect
ed by public expenditure, and growth in turn affects the distribution of income. Not only that,
the nature of growth resulting from the public efforts is also affected by the existing income
distribution (Alfranca and Galindo, 2003).
The actual research on the direct relationship between public spending and income distri
bution continues to be much more concentrated on the impact or benefit analysis of particular
types of government expenditure on particular income groups (like the poor) instead of the income distribution in general (Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). Nevertheless, there are a few studies
that have focused on the wide impact on income distribution, either for a particular country or
in cross country analyses. For example, de Mello and Tiongson (2006) in a cross-country
analysis (the sample running from 27 to 56 countries depending on availability of data) of the
impact of government spending on income distribution find the overall effects to be un-equal
izing. In fact, those countries where redistribution is most needed, due to high inequality, are
also less likely to have effective redistributive policies in place. In the case of country studies,
for Brazil Clements (1997) similarly finds that government social expenditures have con
tributed to exacerbate income inequalities. On the contrary, Jao (2000) finds that in the case of
Taiwan, public expenditures on social assistance and social insurance contributed positively to
reducing income inequality. However, a number of developing countries worldwide have im
plemented conditional cash transfers systems that link spending to actual use of the public serv
ice being provided, leading to better impact of government social spending on the poor 13.
In a recent paper, Boustan et al. (2010) looked at the relationship between government
spending and income inequality from exactly the opposite angle. For counties and municipal
ities in the United States (for 1970-2000) they analyzed the effect of inequality on public
spending. They find that as inequality rises (across time and across regions) public spending
rises as well 14. However, those increased expenditures are mainly over police, fire protection,
road maintenance, but also schools, while financing has continued to shift from property taxes
to other sales and other more regressive taxes. Thus Boustan et al. (2010) conclude that al
though inequality results in higher spending, tax financing and spending programs as a whole
do not contribute to improving income distribution, which fits well into the evidence of a
widening income gap in the USA (Smeeding, 2004; Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001) 15.
In summary, the literature has focused on the relationships between growth and income dis
tribution, and between public spending and growth. On the relationship between public spend
ing and income distribution, considerable research efforts have mainly concentrated on the im
pact of particular types of spending on different income classes. Much less research effort has
gone into analyzing the effect of the variability of public spending composition on the distribu
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tion of income as a whole. No doubt this latter type of research has been hampered by the un
availability of uniform data across countries not only for income distribution itself but also for
public spending. Overall, it would seem fair to conclude that the evidence so far suggests that
properly targeted public expenditure in social welfare and in human capital formation, such as
health and education, has the potential to affect income distribution positively especially when
effectively targeted, which unfortunately is proving hard to design and implement.

The interaction of taxes and public spending and income distribution
There has been less research looking at the combined effects of taxes and public expen
ditures on income distribution. In a recent study for Brazil, Baer and Galvao (2008) found
that when the tax and expenditure system are considered together, the system tends to favor
the higher income classes. Also, Immervoll and Richardson (2011) recently studied the im
pact of tax-benefit systems in OECD countries over the last two decades. They focus on in
equality trends among ‘non-elderly” households and on the role played by the personal income tax and social security taxes paid by employees on the one hand, and cash transfers
received, such as unemployment benefits etc, on the other hand. They conclude that even
though tax-benefit systems have become more redistributive since the 1980s, that trend has
not been large enough to offset the increasing trend in market- income inequality which grew
by twice as much as redistribution. In addition, the redistributive strenght of tax-benefit sys
tem weakened in many OECD countries between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s. They
also conclude that in terms of redistribution strength, direct “benefits” had a much stronger
impact on redistribution than personal income taxes and social security contributions, de
spite the much larger relative size of these taxes in GDP vis-à-vis direct benefits paid. Because of this composition of redistributive tools, redistributive policies in OECD countries
have been more effective in closing income gaps at the bottom of the income distribution
than at the top. In restoring incomes for the poorest, the most effective policy is to encour
age employemnt and earnings growth amongs these groups.

4. Empirical Estimation Approach
This section discusses the methodology we apply to test the relationship between tax
system and expenditure structure, and income inequality. We use a multivariate regression
framework to analyze the impact of personal income tax, other taxes, and public expendi
tures on income distribution. This is a departure from most previous studies that, as we saw
in the review of the literature above, use microsimulation techniques to estimate that impact
in a country specific context. From the outset we need to be aware that this approach also
has limitations. For one, we are limited in the full recognition of within country heterogene
ity regarding policy instruments in the tax and expenditure sides, behavioral responses by
households and so on. However we are able to account for the impact of most taxes and
spending patterns on a large international scale with cross-country comparisons and the evo
lution overtime of within-country variations in policies and changes in income distribution.
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Income inequality is measured here by the Gini coefficient, although of course in
equality has many other dimensions 16. The term “redistribution” is used to mean a reduc
tion in income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficients as the result of government
policies controlling for other factors that typically have been identified in the literature as
significant determinants of income distribution. On the side of government policies we
consider all direct and indirect taxes 17, as well as a variety of government expenditures be
yond social welfare expenditures 18. We take a long term view of how tax and expenditure
policies may have affected income distribution over a continuum of 30 + years. Using a
multi-country study can be criticized because even though income distribution is affected
by a set of common factors across countries, there are many institutions and processes that
are particular to each country that cannot be reflected in the variables used in the regres
sion. However, this issue is minimized because in our estimation technique we control for
those fixed country effects.
We consider first the tax side alone; then the expenditure side alone, and finally, both
tax and expenditure sides, and compare how this affects the estimated coefficients. The im
pact of changes in taxes on income distribution is captured using ratios to GDP. The larger
the share of any particular taxes on GDP, the larger the potential impact (positive or nega
tive) on income distribution.

The model
In investigating the impact of tax and expenditure policies on income inequality, we
focus on the evolution of the Gini coefficient, which is computed on the basis of income dis
tribution using different concepts of income, including gross income, net income and con
sumption. This presents some measurement and comparability issues that we can only par
tially address below. We are interested in finding out how the tax structure and its
progressivity, as well as public spending and a set of other control explanatory variables,
have affected the Gini coefficient over time in our sample of countries.
It is almost certain that income inequality in a current year depends on its level(s) in pre
vious year(s) and a set of variables that is commonly used in the literature to explain income
inequality (see Milanovic, 2006; De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Gupta, Davoodi, and AlonsoTerme, 2002). Starting from this assumption, we test the overall hypothesis that both tax and
expenditure structures are important determinants of income inequality. Therefore, the
model to be estimated has the following form:

giniit = α giniit−1 + γ Fit + β Xit + υi + εit ,

i =1,,… n; t = 1,…T

(1)

In equation (1), giniit represents the gini coefficient in country i in year t, i = 1, … n, t
= 1, … T, while giniit–1 represents its value in year t – 1. Next, Fit, stands for a vector of fis
cal variables representing tax instruments and public expenditures in country i in year t. The
variables representing tax instruments are personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax
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(CIT), social security contributions (SSC) and payroll taxes, general sales tax (GST), excis
es, and customs duties. On the expenditure side we focus on four types of public expendi
tures that we anticipate can have significant differential impacts on income distribution;
namely, expenditures for social protection, for education, for health, and for housing. The
vector Xit represents the set of control variables that have been consistently found to play a
significant role in explaining income inequality in the previous literature. These include pop
ulation growth, age dependency, the level of globalization, GDP per capita growth, unem
ployment, the extent of corruption, education level, and the size of government. Finally, in
the error term, υi stands for unobserved country fixed effects. Further discussion of all the
variables of interest and control variables is provided below in this section.
We need to address several econometric problems that may arise in the estimation of
equation (1). First, the variables representing tax instruments and public expenditures in Fit
are likely to be endogenous, due to reverse causality– from income inequality to chosen fis
cal policy instruments and vice versa. In particular, countries with higher income inequality
may choose to rely relatively more on direct taxation and/or public expenditures, and vice
versa. As a result, these regressors may be correlated with the error term. This reverse
causality between inequality and progressive measures largely based on the median voter
model goes back to Meltzer and Richard (1981) and it has been further developed by Pers
son and Tabellini (1999) and others. It is hypothesized that as income distribution becomes
more unequal and skewed, lowering the ratio of median to mean income, a majority of vot
ers in a coalition with the median voter is more likely to vote for higher taxes and greater
levels of redistribution. Besides this argument for potential reverse causality, endogeneity
may also arise due to omitted variables and measurement error 19.
Time-invariant unobserved country fixed effects may be correlated with the explanato
ry variables. The fixed effects are contained in the error term υit in equation (1), which con
sists of the unobserved country-specific effects, υi, and the observation-specific errors, εit,
υit = υi + εit.
Third, the presence of the lagged dependent variable giniit–1 is likely to give rise to au
tocorrelation. Finally, the panel dataset has a relatively short time dimension (T = 30) and
relatively larger country dimension (N = 150). This causes a potential problem because when
the time period is short, the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term,
and hence the dynamic panel bias, may be significant. In this case, applying a straightfor
ward fixed effects estimator would not be appropriate (Roodman, 2006).
To address the endogeneity problem, one would usually choose an instrumental vari
ables approach. However, finding good instruments for all observed types of taxation and
public expenditures is a significant challenge. For example Duncan and Sabirianova Peter
(2008) address the endogeneity of their progressivity measure by using an instrumental vari
able corresponding to the progressivity measures from neighboring countries weighted by
distance and population 20. Using OLS is likely to yield biased and inconsistent estimated
coefficients given the presence of heterogeneity among countries. However, using a fixed ef
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fects estimation to account for that heterogeneity is questionable given the small variation in
the Gini coefficients (the dependent variable) for a significant part of the sample. To address
the second, third and fourth potential problems, we use the GMM estimator (Arellano and
Bond, 1991), which was first proposed by (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, 1988). The dif
ference GMM estimator uses first differences to transform equation (1) into

Δginiit = αΔginigit−1 + γΔFit + βΔXit + Δυi + Δεit .

(2)

Because fixed country-specific effects do not vary over time, they disappear by this
transformation, solving problem (2). That is,

Δυit = Δυi + Δεit

(3)

υit − υit−1 = υi − υi + εit − εit−1

(4)

υit − υit−1 = εit − ε it −1

(5)

or

The autocorrelation problem is addressed by “instrumenting” the first-differenced
lagged dependent variable with its past levels. Also note that the Arellano – Bond estimator
is designed for small-T large-N panels. In large-T panels, a shock to the country-specific
fixed effect, which appears in the error term, declines with time. Similarly, the correlation of
the lagged dependent variable with the error term is insignificant (Roodman, 2006). On the
other hand, if N is small, the cluster-robust standard errors and the Arellano-Bond autocor
relation test may be unreliable. In these cases, using the Arellano – Bond estimator would
not be necessary.

5. Variables and data
This study uses an unbalanced panel data on 150 developed, developing and transition
countries, between 1970 and 2009. The dependent variable, income inequality, is measured
by the Gini coefficient. Given low data coverage for Gini coefficients and also, the more sur
prising, scarcity of data on tax collections and especially public expenditures, the actual
number of observations used in each regression is often significantly reduced.

Measuring income inequality
The consumption based Gini coefficients have the advantage that they can be interpreted
as being a better approximation of permanent income (Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008).
Beyond the limitation of measuring inequality in the distribution of income with the Gini co
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efficient, we also need to acknowledge that in the presence of considerable tax evasion due to
informality and unreported income, the changes in observed income are not be necessary the
same as those in true income (a point developed also in Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008).
From the theory and practice of tax incidence we anticipate that progressive personal income taxes should contribute to a more equal distribution of income the more so the larger
the PIT revenue collections are as a share of GDP and the higher the progressivity of the PIT.
In particular, progressivity is measured as average rate of progression up to an income level
equivalent to y (where y is a country’s per capita GDP), which is a measure of PIT progres
sivity developed by Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2010). On their formal structure, personal
income taxes over the past three decades have experienced a reduction in the number of tax
rate brackets, maximum statutory rates and also complexity. These trends are highlighted by
the large number of countries that have adopted flat rate PITs, especially in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union countries.

Measuring income tax progressivity
Here we will use the measure of progressivity developed by Sabirianova Peter et al.
(2010). As these authors point out, progressivity has been measured in the literature by ei
ther identifying the top statutory rate in the personal income tax schedule which has obvi
ous limitations given the complexity of most personal income taxes, or in the form of an
effective inequality-based index which requires before and after taxation measures of income distribution, or structural progressivity measures which capture changes in average
and marginal rates along the income distribution which do not require information on after
tax outcomes in income distribution (Musgrave and Thin, 1948). This latter is the approach
followed by Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010). They produce a single, comprehensive meas
ure of PIT progressivity by first deriving average and marginal tax rates along the income
distribution (using the country’s GDP per capita and its multiples as a comparable income
base) and then applying the tax schedule and structure information (standard deductions,
personal allowances, tax credits, and so on) to arrive at the taxes due and the marginal and
average effective tax rates.

Variables of Interest: Taxes and Public Expenditures
As this study investigates the effect of government tax and expenditure policy on income
inequality, our variables of interest are individual tax instruments and certain types of pub
lic expenditures. We discuss first the separate tax instruments. Here, our ex ante expectations
of the impact of each tax on income inequality are based on what is generally accepted in the
tax incidence literature (Martinez-Vazquez, 2008).
Personal income taxes generally are assumed to be progressive, contributing to lower income inequality. However, not all personal income taxes are created equal in terms of their
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structure and resulting overall level of progressivity, thus to identify the impact of the PIT
on income inequality it becomes very important to observe its level of progressivity. For that
reason, we interact the personal income tax variable with a personal income tax progressiv
ity measure derived by Peter, Buttrick and Duncan (2010).
In the case of corporate income taxes, the conventional wisdom on its incidence is much
more controversial. To the extent that the tax falls on capital income recipients, the CIT is a
progressive tax. However, with high capital mobility and globalization, a higher share of its
tax burden will tend to fall on internationally less mobile factors of production, namely
labor. To allow for this difference in final incidence, the CIT variable is interacted with an
index of globalization for each country, which is discussed further below. The more open the
economy the higher share of the CIT that would fall on labor income making this tax less
progressive.
While PIT can be progressive, social security contributions and payroll taxes can be
regressive, i.e. representing a larger part of pretax income for low income workers. So
cial security contributions and payroll taxes are commonly shared between employees
and employers. However, it is commonly accepted in tax incidence theory that employ
ers tend to almost entirely shift the burden to employees in form of lower wages. And un
like the case of the PIT and CIT, social security contributions and payroll taxes are gen
erally thought as not being progressive and possibly regressive because in most cases
contributions are capped with income, so the overall burden or average rate tends to decreases with income.
As indirect taxes are ultimately paid by consumers, and lower income groups spend a
higher share of their incomes, relatively higher reliance on general sales taxes, excises and/or
customs duties is generally expected to result in higher real income inequality. However, the
most important indirect tax, the general consumption tax or value-added tax (VAT) can be
designed with some features (exemption of basic commodities, lower rates, and so on) that
can significantly mitigate the regressivity of this tax. To allow for differences on the impact
of the VAT and other indirect taxes on inequality we introduce each of these taxes separate
ly in the regressions. We must note also that among excise taxes, there are some that can be
highly regressive (e.g., a tax on kerosene fuel, used mostly by poor households in develop
ing countries) or quite progressive (e.g., surtaxes on some luxury items mostly consumed by
high income households). Unfortunately the data we have does not allow us to differentiate
among the different excises.
On the public expenditure side, we focus on four important types of public expenditures
(by functional classification) which can be expected to have a significant impact on reduc
ing inequality; namely, social protection, education, health, and housing expenditure. As in
case of taxes, expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP. These four types of ex
penditures have functions that target households and individuals in order to improve their
welfare. The logic is that the higher the ratio of GDP that is dedicated to these different types
of expenditures, the more likely income distribution will improve. This will be so in terms

The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Policies on Income Distribution: Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries

111

of market income (gross and net) for higher expenditures on human capital creation servic
es such as health and education and on social welfare expenditures having to do with income
protection and maintenance programs. In the case of other public expenditures, such as hous
ing, they may also have a positive impact on equality, especially when this is measured in
terms of the distribution of consumption.
It is very likely that within each of these aggregate categories of spending, incidence of
subcategories would vary, so it would be ideal to observe more disaggregated categories of
public spending. Ideally, the data should identify under social protection those programs that
have the highest impact on inequality, such as cash transfers programs to the unemployed or
elderly as well as income tax credits or transfers to low income households. Unfortunately,
data with such level of disaggregation do not exist at the international level. Similarly, it
would be very desirable to have disaggregated information on expenditures on education and
health. For our analysis, therefore, we are forced to employ the aggregate categories of ex
penditures measured as percent of GDP. Even though these variables are subject to observa
tion error-induced by the level of aggregation, we are hopeful they still can tell an interest
ing story. We anticipate all four types of expenditures to have a positive effect on income
equality.

Control Variables
To avoid specification biases in our estimates of the impact of tax and spending pat
terns on income inequality it is important that in the regressions we account for the relevant
economic and social determinants of income distribution consistently found in the previous
literature on income distribution (see Milanovic, 2006; De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Gupta,
Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 2002). These control variables generally consider changes in
labor supply, labor demand, and an assortment of institutional changes. For example, de
pending on how welfare and social security programs work, they may adapt to reduce in
equalities as the level of unemployment increases, although not enough to offset the decrease in market income for the unemployed. Factors affecting labor supply include
population size, age structure, and education attainment. On the labor demand side, impor
tant factors include technological change, international trade and outsourcing. Finally, the
quality of institutions is very important because it affects the impact of changes in the labor
market. For example, high political corruption allows certain interest groups to influence
policy-makers to implement policies that do not necessarily benefit low-income groups. In
addition, the size of government also matters. Larger governments may be more able to
meet the demands of low-income households and individuals through different social pro
grams. More specifically, the control variables we include in the regressions are described
in the following paragraphs.
The population growth rate is expected to have positive effect on income inequality as
faster growing societies experience faster growing demand for public services and increased
difficulties of governments to provide those services; at the same time market earnings are
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expected to be more diverse. Moreover, faster growing population likely leads to an increase
in the ratio of profits and rents to labor earnings. Since income from profits and rents are less
equally distributed than labor income (Kuznets, 1963), a faster growing population may lead
to less equally distributed income (Boulier, 1975).
Income distribution in a country also depends on the age structure. To capture this di
mension, previous works on income inequality commonly use two demographic variables:
the youth dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of the number of persons ages 0–15 to the
number of persons ages 16–64) and the old-age dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of per
sons ages 65 or over to the number of persons ages 16–64). Higher youth dependency is ex
pected to likely result in higher income inequality, mainly because higher youth dependen
cy suggests higher average number of children per household and lower household per capita
income. On the other hand, larger share of elderly in population is expected to be associat
ed with relatively lower income inequality. The literature suggests that the effect of old-age
dependency ratio on income inequality basically depends on the design of the pension sys
tem. In a case when there are no government programs, higher ratio of elderly to working
population raises income inequality, while in presence of a redistributive tax-transfer scheme
and state pensions, an aging population decreases inequality (Von Weizsacker, 1989). Hav
ing in mind that in most countries elderly represent significant group of voters, it is likely
that politicians, whose objective is maximizing number of votes, would implement govern
ment programs that would benefit elderly, resulting in lower income inequality.
Another important component of income inequality is level of education of individuals.
There is a large literature on the effect of education on income inequality which can be di
vided into two groups; namely, on the one side are studies that find that more unequal edu
cation distribution implies more income inequality (the so-called “composition” effect), and
on the other side are studies that find that a higher average education level leads to less income inequality (the “compression” effect) (Knight and Sabot, 1983). In order to account for
this effect, we include a variable measuring the average number of years of schooling in
country i in year t. Higher level of education is assumed to increase disposable income to
households and individuals, and potentially reduce income inequality.
Similarly, higher unemployment rate is associated with many economic changes that
have important consequences for income distribution. The literature suggests that higher un
employment increases inequality of income and welfare because unemployment risks are
higher among low-income earners (Bjorklung, 1991). Unemployment reduces the ability of
people to earn income and achieve standard of living, potentially leading to higher income
inequality. On the other hand, economic development measured by GDP per capita growth
rate implies higher disposable income per capita and per household, and may be associated
with lower income inequality, although this is not necessarily the case because different in
equality patterns can hide behind the same GDP per capita growth ratios .
We also introduce two institutional variables. First, there has been an intense debate in
recent years about the effect of globalization on the distribution of income. Studies like
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WEO (2007) find that globalization has been one of the factors that have negatively affect
ed labor income in advanced economies therefore becoming an important factor behind in
creased inequality. In order to capture this dimension of income inequality, we use the KOF
index of globalization (Dreher, 2006; updated Dreher, Noel, and Martens, 2008), which
takes values between zero and hundred (higher values denote greater globalization). The
globalization index takes into account actual economic flows (e.g. trade, stock of FDI), eco
nomic restrictions (e.g. import barriers, tariff rates), data on information flows (e.g. internet
users, trade in newspapers), data on personal contact (e.g. telephone traffic, international
tourism), and data on cultural proximity.
Second, in order to control for the quality of overall governance and efficiency of the
public sector we control for the level of corruption. There have not been many studies on the
impact of corruption on income inequality. Those few papers that do investigate this rela
tionship find that corruption increases income inequality, mostly by reducing economic
growth (Gupta et al. 2002). We can also reasonably assume that high levels of corruption are
correlated with tax evasion, which is more likely to make the true distribution of income
more unequal (as in Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008). We measure corruption with the
ICRG’s assessment of corruption within the political system and it is expected to lead to in
creased inequality because such corruption distorts the economic and financial environment
and affects people’s ability to earn income and achieve reasonable standards of living. Final
ly, we control for the size of government as a proxy for the ability of governments to respond
to the demands of lower income households and individuals.
By looking at the impact of all taxes (and not only personal income taxes and social con
tributions as in Immervoll and Richardson, 2011) and many different categories of expendi
tures (and not just direct cash transfers to the non elderly as for example in Immervoll and
Richardson (2011)), the scope of this study goes beyond what has been done in the previous
literature. But what we gain in completeness by looking at all taxes and several expenditures,
we lose in detail for being able to identify for example individual cash transfer programs.

6. Empirical Findings
As mentioned above, our empirical analysis consists of three parts. In the first part we
focus our analysis only on the tax structure and its effect on income inequality. In the sec
ond part our interest is to investigate distributional effect of different types of public expen
ditures. Finally, in the third part we combine both tax instruments and types of public spend
ing and evaluate their joint effect on income inequality.

Taxation and Income Inequality
Table 1 below presents the results obtained from estimating model (1) when only tax
variables are included in the analysis along with the other control variables. Column (1) pres
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ents the benchmark results obtained by including only control variables. Most of the control
variables are statistically significant and have the predicted sign as discussed above. First,
our results provide support to the hypothesis that demographic changes affect income in
equality. Faster growing countries, as expected, seem to experience larger income inequali
ty, which corresponds to the findings in the literature. However, we do not limit our analy
sis only on observing population growth, but also other aspects of population dynamics.
More precisely, we consider the effect of age structure in terms of young- and old-age de
pendency ratios and provide some support to the hypothesis that these two groups of depend
ent population have the opposite effect on income inequality. Furthermore, as suggested by
the large literature on education and income inequality, higher average education level im
plies more equal income distribution. Similarly, we provide support to the hypothesis that a
higher unemployment rate increases inequality in income distribution. Furthermore, our re
sults on the effect of globalization and corruption are consistent with findings from the liter
ature which suggests that higher globalization and corruption increase income inequality. Fi
nally, we find that countries with larger governments have more equal income distribution,
due to their ability to respond better to the needs of the population. Columns (2)-(7) of Table
1 present the results obtained by individually including each alternative tax instruments in
equation (1).
As the results in column (2) suggest, PIT has the expected positive effect on income in
equality, and this effect increases with more progressive tax structure, even though the eco
nomic effect is not very large. For example, with zero progressivity of PIT, one percentage
point increase in the share of PIT to GDP results in a 0.1 percentage point reduction in income inequality. In addition, one percentage point increase in PIT progressivity increases the
negative effect of PIT on income inequality by 0.005 percentage points.
Column (3) presents the results obtained by focusing only on the effect of CIT on income inequality.
Theory on the incidence of social security contributions and payroll taxes suggests that
imposing these types of taxes results in a combination of lower real wages and higher unem
ployment rates. While these taxes are commonly levied equally between employers and em
ployees, there is a broad consensus among economists that they are mostly shifted to em
ployees in form of low wages, ultimately resulting in increased income inequality. Results
on column 4 in Table 1 provide support to this hypothesis – an increase of one percentage
point in the share of social security taxes leads to an increase in income inequality by 0.7
percentage points.
The common perception regarding the general sales tax— GST (or VAT)— is that is
regressive because poorer households spend a greater share of their income on consump
tion, so they are likely to pay higher average tax relative to the higher income households.
However, not much empirical work has been done so far testing this general conjecture.
The results obtained in column (5) of Table 1 provide support to that hypothesis. Our re
sults suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the share of GST in GDP increas
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es income inequality by around 0.5 percentage points. As we have commented above, all
other types of indirect taxes, excises and customs duties may be regressive. Our results
in columns (6) and (7) provide only weak support to this hypothesis with estimated coef
ficient being positive but not statistically significant, probably reflecting the composition
of such taxes.
Finally, in column 8 of Table 1 we present the results obtained by estimating model (1)
when all tax instruments are included, but still without taking into account public spending.
Most of the estimated coefficients keep their expected sign, but some of them lose statistical
significance, which may be explained by a significant reduction of the sample size when all
tax instruments are included (sample size reduces by 32 percent when all tax instruments are
included). In particular, the estimated coefficient CIT and the interaction term of CIT and
globalization remain statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for PIT and the in
teraction term of PIT and PIT progressivity are also jointly significant at 5 percent signifi
cance level. Moreover, all tax variables are jointly significant at 1 percent significance level.
In summary, the results in Table 1 show —as far as we know for the first time in the lit
erature—, in a rich multi-country panel context the validation of most of the conventional
conclusions on the final economic incidence of different taxes, which typically have been ap
plied and tested in the context of static country-case studies 21.

Public Spending and Income Inequality
We turn now to the results obtained on the effect of public spending on income in
equality. As we already explained above, we focus on four types of social spending; name
ly, social protection expenditures, expenditures on education, health, and housing. As in
case of taxation, here also we first estimate the model (1) by introducing separately types
of expenditures, and then we estimate the model by including all four expenditure cate
gories. It is important to point out that internationally comparable data on functional clas
sification of expenditures is very scarce, which has an effect on our results, especially
when all expenditure categories are included in the model. Including only social protec
tion expenditures in the model results in a reduction of sample size by 35 percent. Column
(2) in Table 2 shows the results obtained by estimating this regression. Our results suggest
that one percentage point increase in expenditures for social protection reduces income in
equality by 0.14 percentage points. A similar effect is estimated for expenditures on edu
cation in column 3. Estimated effects of expenditures on health and household are a bit
higher – one percentage point in these two types of expenditures leads to a reduction in income inequality by between 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points. Finally, when all four expen
diture components are included in the model, all but education keep their expected sign,
with only expenditure on health remaining statistically significant. This loss in signifi
cance could be very well contributed to a significant reduction (56 percent) in sample size.
But note that all four categories of expenditures in column 6 of Table 2 are jointly signif
icant at the 1 percent significance level.

PIT*Progressivity

PIT

Total Revenues

Corruption

Globalization

GDP pc growth

Unemployment

Education Level

Age Dep. Elderly

Age Dep. Youth

Pop. growth

Gross

Net

Gini-1

(2)
0.019***
(0.005)
5.281***
(0.509)
5.593***
(0.508)
0.479***
(0.126)
–0.040**
(0.020)
–0.028
(0.079)
–0.390***
(0.077)
0.153***
(0.007)
–0.009**
(0.004)
0.083***
(0.011)
0.173***
(0.057)
–0.027***
(0.007)
–0.094**
(0.043)
–0.005***
(0.001)

(1)

–0.061*
(0.033)
5.164***
(1.010)
5.424***
(1.236)
0.593***
(0.203)
0.122***
(0.041)
–0.498***
(0.128)
–0.787***
(0.159)
0.133***
(0.020)
0.011
(0.009)
0.113***
(0.017)
0.203***
(0.064)
–0.020
(0.021)
–0.069***
(0.010)
4.893***
(0.292)
4.179***
(0.343)
0.113
(0.205)
–0.078***
(0.017)
–0.272**
(0.138)
–0.244***
(0.049)
0.098***
(0.019)
–0.008
(0.005)
0.082***
(0.022)
0.337***
(0.031)
0.005
(0.023)

(3)
0.048
(0.051)
–0.810
(4.261)
0.300
(3.799)
0.338
(0.259)
0.105**
(0.044)
–0.621***
(0.178)
–0.559***
(0.201)
0.105***
(0.031)
0.021
(0.014)
0.080***
(0.024)
0.274***
(0.064)
–0.069*
(0.036)

(4)
0.009
(0.035)
4.608***
(0.937)
4.824***
(1.179)
0.486**
(0.192)
0.127***
(0.044)
–0.404***
(0.124)
–0.782***
(0.222)
0.139***
(0.028)
0.011
(0.011)
0.106***
(0.015)
0.233***
(0.067)
–0.059***
(0.022)

(5)

TABLE 1
TAZATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY
(6)
–0.156***
(0.036)
5.170***
(1.103)
6.091***
(1.469)
0.126
(0.290)
0.159**
(0.062)
–0.363***
(0.140)
–0.462**
(0.208)
0.147***
(0.027)
0.010
(0.009)
0.069***
(0.021)
0.326***
(0.081)
0.019
(0.023)

(7)
–0.066*
(0.036)
4.762***
(1.396)
5.159***
(1.677)
0.473**
(0.192)
0.190***
(0.061)
–0.706***
(0.138)
–0.428**
(0.205)
0.130***
(0.022)
0.016
(0.011)
0.089***
(0.019)
0.211***
(0.074)
–0.006
(0.020)

(8)

–0.105
(0.098)
–0.004
(0.003)

0.110***
(0.015)
2.173
(2.273)
3.290
(2.409)
0.124
(0.316)
–0.074
(0.062)
–0.102
(0.160)
–1.139***
(0.222)
0.121*
(0.066)
–0.042**
(0.018)
0.035
(0.028)
0.009
(0.194)

116
JORGE MARTÍNEZ-VÁZQUEZ, BLANCA MORENO-DODSON AND VIOLETA VULOVIC

31.400***
(3.503)
936
79
42.92
0.866

30.658***
(1.848)
713
69
58.41
0,857

(2)

38.326***
(1.917)
834
75
66.80
0.727

–0.703***
(0.109)
0.009***
(0.002)

(3)

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Observations
Number of id
Sargam
AR2

Constant

Customs

Excises

GST

SSC+Payroll

CIT*Globalization

CIT

(1)

39.337***
(5.696)
873
74
37.12
0.950

0.720***
(0.168)

(4)

32.397***
(3.994)
908
78
35.21
0.798

0.485***
(0.154)

(5)

TABLE 1 (continued)
TAXATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY

35.120***
(4.698)
834
71
35.74
0.960

0.258
(0.195)

(6)

0.130
(0.178)
30.118***
(4.372)
871
75
39.58
0.992

(7)

–0.925**
(0.397)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.234
(0.168)
0.314
(0.343)
0.988***
(0.301)
–0.497
(0.393)
35.716***
(3.720)
634
56
37.69
1.153

(8)
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Education

Social Protection

Total Revenues

Corruption

Globalization

GDP pc growth

Unemployment

Education Level

Age Dep. Elderly

Age Dep. Youth

Pop. growth

Gross

Net

Gini-1

–0.061*
(0.033)
5.164***
(1.010)
5.424***
(1.236)
0.593***
(0.203)
0.122***
(0.041)
–0.498***
(0.128)
–0.787***
(0.159)
0.133***
(0.020)
0.011
(0.009)
0.113***
(0.017)
0.203***
(0.064)
–0.020
(0.021)

(1)
–0.066***
(0.009)
5.748***
(1.189)
4.783***
(1.219)
0.726***
(0.254)
–0.046***
(0.018)
–0.118
(0.110)
0.027
(0.047)
0.119***
(0.013)
–0.007*
(0.004)
0.090***
(0.014)
0.415***
(0.030)
–0.063***
(0.017)
–0.139***
(0.038)

(2)

–0.134**
(0.058)

–0.152***
(0.011)
4.672***
(0.524)
2.987***
(0.833)
0.239***
(0.091)
–0.076***
(0.027)
–0.315***
(0.070)
–0.014
(0.078)
0.097***
(0.011)
0.003
(0.007)
0.120***
(0.014)
0.392***
(0.029)
–0.085***
(0.016)

(3)
–0.088***
(0.006)
5.140***
(0.395)
3.762***
(0.687)
0.334***
(0.074)
–0.009
(0.015)
–0.257***
(0.066)
–0.167**
(0.069)
0.062***
(0.007)
–0.022***
(0.004)
0.164***
(0.010)
0.369***
(0.015)
–0.040***
(0.007)

(4)

TABLE 2
EXPENDITURES AND INCOME INEQUALITY
–0.197***
(0.016)
5.379***
(0.394)
3.977***
(0.496)
1.160***
(0.254)
0.184***
(0.025)
–0.324
(0.217)
–0.417***
(0.093)
0.112***
(0.012)
–0.006
(0.005)
0.260***
(0.016)
0.169***
(0.027)
–0.002
(0.013)

(5)

–0.123
(0.097)
0.038
(0.175)

–0.097**
(0.040)
5.951***
(1.224)
3.499*
(1.951)
1.489***
(0.554)
0.203**
(0.086)
–0.449**
(0.192)
–0.142
(0.191)
0.188***
(0.032)
0.008
(0.008)
0.213***
(0.023)
0.163
(0.134)

(6)
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31.400***
(3.503)
936
79
42.92
0.866

33.828***
(1.923)
604
65
51.23
0.988

(2)

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Observations
Number of id
Sargan
AR2

Constant

Housing

Health

(1)

42.334***
(1.755)
643
67
55.81
0.746

(3)

35.543***
(1.525)
694
72
55.92
0.816

–0.695***
(0.030)

(4)

TABLE 2 (continued)
EXPENDITURES AND INCOME INEQUALITY

–0.768***
(0.068)
24.468***
(4.247)
503
61
48.34
0.650

(5)

–0.415*
(0.230)
–0.139
(0.168)
21.441**
(9.714)
410
54
41.62
1.071

(6)
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In summary, in spite of the high level of aggregation with which we measure the four
categories of “redistributional expenditures” we find in agreement with the previous litera
ture that, overall, they contribute to reduce income inequality. Also note that in general, as
has been previously found in country-case studies, dollar per dollar fiscal tools in the expen
diture side of the budget tend to be more effective than redistributive measures in the rev
enue side of the budget. For example, using personal income tax to redistribute income
would result in lower reduction in income inequality than relying on any type observed so
cial expenditures. On the other hand, corporate income tax shows to be close to an equally
effective tool of income inequality reduction as some forms of government spending. How
ever, using heavily corporate income tax as a tool of income redistribution has a drawback
because as soon as capital is able to leave the country and avoid taxation, the burden of cor
porate income tax falls on labor leading to the opposite than planned effect of such a policy.
A third option would be to reduce taxation on consumption. However, consumption
taxes constitute a very important component of government revenues, especially in develop
ing countries where the formal tax base is not well established and using indirect taxes is
very important for collecting of government revenues. On the other hand, using any type of
observed social expenditures shows to be effective in the reduction of income inequality. For
example revenue neutral combination of one percentage point increase in the collection of
general sales tax to GDP and equal increase in housing expenditures would result in a reduc
tion of income inequality of 0.3 percentage points.
Taxation and Public Spending and Income Inequality
Finally, Table 3 presents results obtained by including all tax and expenditures cate
gories in the sample. Due to a significant reduction in sample size (68 percent) due to miss
ing values, most of variables in the model lose their statistical significance. Among tax in
struments, only PIT and excise taxes keep their expected signs, with this latter being
statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. On the expenditure side, estimated coef
ficients on expenditures on social protection and health keep their negative signs, but only
social protection expenditures are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The lack of
degrees of freedom and the generally weak results in Table 3 prevent us from examining the
question of whether fiscal redistribution tools on the revenue and expenditure sides of the
budget tend to work as complements or substitutes, although the weak results point toward
complementarity. This is a question that awaits a more complete panel data set.
Table 3
TAXATION, EXPENDITURES AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Variable
Gini-1
Net

(1)
–0.061*
(0.033)
5.164***
(1.010)

(2)
0.110***
(0.015)
2.173
(2.273)

(3)
–0.097**
(0.040)
5.951***
(1.224)

(4)
–0.026
(0.044)
10.902***
(3.780)
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TABLE 3 (continued)
TAXATION, EXPENDITURES AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Variable
Gross
Pop. growth
Age Dep. Youth
Age Dep. Elderly
Education Level
Unemployment
GDP pc growth
Globalization
Corruption
PIT
PIT*Progressivity
CIT
CIT*Globalization
SSC+Payroll
GST
Excises
Customs
Social Protection
Education
Health

(1)
5.424***
(1.236)
0.593***
(0.203)
0.122***
(0.041)
–0.498***
(0.128)
–0.787***
(0.159)
0.133***
(0.020)
0.011
(0.009)
0.113***
(0.017)
0.203***
(0.064)

(2)
3.290
(2.409)
0.124
(0.316)
–0.074
(0.062)
–0.102
(0.160)
–1.139***
(0.222)
0.121*
(0.066)
–0.042**
(0.018)
0.035
(0.028)
0.009
(0.194)
–0.105
(0.098)
–0.004
(0.003)
–0.925**
(0.397)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.234
(0.168)
0.314
(0.343)
0.988***
(0.301)
–0.497
(0.393)

(3)
3.499*
(1.951)
1.489***
(0.554)
0.203**
(0.086)
–0.449**
(0.192)
–0.142
(0.191)
0.188***
(0.032)
0.008
(0.008)
0.213***
(0.023)
0.163
(0.134)

–0.123
(0.097)
0.038
(0.175)
–0.415*
(0.230)

(4)
10.429**
(4.419)
3.098***
(1.087)
–0.347
(0.423)
0.169
(1.021)
–0.295
(0.550)
0.173
(0.141)
-0.070
(0.052)
0.224
(0.217)
0.264
(0.826)
–0.176
(0.690)
–0.013
(0.021)
4.638
(5.703)
–0.065
(0.074)
–0.300
(0.373)
–0.260
(0.394)
3.148**
(1.323)
–0.762
(1.592)
–0.366*
(0.210)
0.506
(0.581)
–0.664
(0.528)
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TABLE 3 (continued)
TAXATION, EXPENDITURES AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Variable

(1)

(2)

Housing
Constant
Observations
Number of id
Sargan
AR2

31.400***
(3.503)
936
79
42.92
0.866

35.716***
(3.720)
634
56
37.69
1.153

(3)
–0.139
(0.168)
21.441**
(9.714)
410
54
41.62
1.071

(4)
0.620
(0.883)
17.770
(42.834)
298
42
19.91
0.929

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

7. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the impact of taxes and some types of public expendi
tures on income distribution using a large panel data set of 150 countries over a period of
over a quarter century (1970-2009). In our empirical analysis, we find significant effects of
both taxes and public spending on the Gini coefficient. On the taxation side, our results gen
erally support the findings in previous individual country incidence analysis studies. Pro
gressive personal income taxes have a positive impact on income distribution, contributing
to decreasing inequality, and this effect is more pronounced the higher the degree of progres
sivity and the higher the share of GDP that is collected with the individual income taxes.
Corporate income taxes also have a positive effect on income distribution but this effect is
eroded away with the degree of globalization or openness. General consumption taxes, ex
cise taxes and customs duties have a negative impact on income distribution. On the expen
diture side, we find that higher shares of GDP on social welfare, education, health, and hous
ing public expenditures have a positive impact on income distribution, individually and
collectively.
In terms of actual economic impact on income distribution, the effects of taxes and
public expenditures is a combination of the estimated marginal effects of each fiscal in
strument and the actual change in policy in the use of the fiscal instruments. Thus, even
though a particular instrument may be relatively ineffective—having a relatively small
marginal impact—this may be more than offset by a large change in the use of that in
strument, and vice versa. Table 4 summarizes the final effects for each fiscal instru
ment taking into account our best estimates of the marginal effects (in Tables 1 and 2)
and allowing a change in the usage of the instruments that is equal to the overall change
between 1990 and 2009. The results are clearly general averages for a large number of
countries and for a long period of time. However, we believe they are good summary
indicators of the overall effects of fiscal policies on income distribution trends world
wide.
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Table 4
ECONOMIC EFFECT OF TAX AND EXPENDITURE POLICY

Policy Instrument

Personal Income Tax
Personal Income Tax
* Progressivity
Corporate Income Tax
Corporate Income Tax
* Globalization
Social Security and
Payroll Taxes
Taxes on Goods
and Services
Excises
Customs Duties
Total Effect of Taxes
Social Protection
Expenditures
Education Expenditures
Health Expenditures
Housing Expenditures

Estimated
Marginal Effect

Increase (+)/
Reduction(–)
between 1990
and 2005
(percentage points)

Resulting increase (+)/
reduction(–) in income
inequality, ceteris
paribus
(percentage points)

–0.09

–0.61

–0.01

1.76

–0.70

0.24

0.01

3.84

0.72

0.98

0.70

0.49

2.10

1.03

0.26
0.13

–0.09
–0.66

–0.02
–0.09

0.04

–0.13

1.53
–0.14

1.57

–0.22

–0.13
–0.70
–0.77

–0.86
2.11
–0.78

0.12
–1.46
0.60

Total Effect of
Expenditures

-0.97

Note: All instruments expressed as % of GDP

Despite the fact that personal income taxes are progressive, the significant decreases in
personal income tax collections as % of GDP accompanied by the overall reduction in the
index of progressivity of these taxes led to a relatively minor increase in overall income in
equality of 0.04 in the Gini coefficient. On the other hand, corporate income taxes, which
also result as being generally progressive, increased in size and, despite the increase in over
all globalization –which tends to decrease the progressivity of this tax—, the overall result
was a contribution to reducing income inequality by 0.13 of the Gini coefficient.
The significant increases in the sizes of social security contributions and payroll taxes,
and general consumption taxes —both being generally regressive— led to much larger increases in income inequality of 0.70 and 1.03 of the Gini coefficient, respectively.
For excises and customs duties —both also generally regressive— their decrease in size
as share of GDP from 1990 to 2009 led to decreases in income inequality of 0.02 and 0.09
of the Gini coefficient, respectively.
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On the expenditure side, the four categories of public expenditures considered, social
protection, education, health, and housing, appear all as being progressive but their impact
has been different depending on how their share if GDP has changed over the 1990-2009 pe
riod. The increases in social protection expenditures led to a reduction of the Gini of 0.22
and the increases in public health expenditures also led to a decrease in inequality, in this
case significantly larger of 1.46 of the Gini. The reductions in public expenditures in educa
tion and housing shares led to increases in inequality of 0.12 and 0.60 of the Gini, respec
tively.
From a policy perspective, we can observe that taxes and public expenditures policies
cannot be identified as strictly substitute or complementary instruments toward redistribu
tion goals 22. For both taxes and expenditures the use of instruments was mixed; some con
tributed to decreasing inequality and some had the opposite effect.
Similarly, our results would not lead us to conclude that expenditure policies have been
more effective overall than taxes in affecting income distribution, although this result needs
to be interpreted with caution because only a few public spending categories have been se
lected. And finally, also from the perspective of a policy maker, it is clear that the overall
impact of fiscal policy as a whole has been quite limited. Over the 1990-2009 period, the net
effect of tax policies was to increase inequality by 1.53 of the Gini while the impact of ex
penditure policies was to decrease inequality by 0.97 of the Gini.
Of course, we must be mindful that income redistribution is not the only objective of fis
cal policy design. Besides collecting revenues, tax and expenditure policies have an impact
on macroeconomic stability as well as the efficient allocation of resources and economic
growth. Even beyond that, in a globalized world, fiscal policy affects the overall competi
tiveness of a country, attracting or discouraging foreign investors. However, based on our
results, its potential to drastically affect the Gini coefficient and change income distribution
patterns should not be overestimated.

Notes
1.

The evidence so far on the impact of the financial crisis on income distribution and the poor is reviewed in
Cuesta and Martinez-Vazquez (2011).

2.

See Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and Cuesta and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) and the references there for reviews
of these literatures.

3.

There is no clear way to select the best representation of the trend but probably the population weighted index
is the most attractive representation since inequality ultimately refers to people (Duncan and Sabirianova
Peter, 2008).

4.

The personal income tax progressivity index is described further below in the data section.

5.

The general incidence of taxes is described in the review of the literature below.

6.

Borge and Rattso’s (2004) work for Norwegian local governments in 1996 supports the Meltzer–Richard hy
pothesis.
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7.

Their measure of progressivity for the individual income tax, which is also used in this paper, is fully devel
oped in Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010).

8.

Due to the presence of tax evasion, Duncan and Peter (2008) argue that under some conditions tax progressiv
ity may induce increased inequality in the distribution of actual income (as measured by consumption) as op
posed to observed income.

9.

Even though a good number of researchers have found that they cannot reject this hypothesis using cross-sec
tion data, others, starting with Clarke (1992) have argued that this hypothesis is basically of time-series nature
and hence should not be tested with cross section data. In addition, some other authors, such as Bruno, Raval
lion, and Squire (1998) and Anand and Kanbur (1993) have argued that with cross section data a careful mon
itoring of the measures of inequality across countries leads to the rejection of the Kuznet’s hypothesis.

10. The previous ‘traditional’ wisdom draws heavily from the Keynesian hypothesis about differences in the
propensity to save, thus that higher income to the affluent implies higher savings and investment which leads
to increases in economic growth; hence, the tradeoff between redistribution and the size of the pie in the macro
sense. For example, most recently, Alfranca and Galindo (2003) found for 19 OECD countries that public ex
penditure positively affects growth and in addition that increased inequality in income distribution also has a
positive impact on growth.
11. But it is also widely acknowledged that that there are instances of seemingly redistributive government spend
ing which do nothing to improve income inequality, and may actually worsen it. For example, Gonzalez
(1995) found in the cases of public education expenditures in Peru, such public ‘merit’ good spending was ac
tually benefitting the non-poor and hence exacerbating the extant skewed distribution of income. The poor tar
geting of distributional expenditure policies is discussed by Harberger (1998).
12. But here again the rent seeking behavior of the elite can change the outcomes, as identified by Araujo (2008)
for Ecuador and Khemani (2010 for India.
13. See for example Bolsa Familia in Brazil and Progresa in Mexico.
14. According to their estimates, “average increase in the city-level Gini Coefficient over this period (5 points)
leads to a $63 increase in expenditures per resident”.
15. For individual country studies on the impact of taxes and transfers on income distribution recent papers in
clude Riihelä et al. (2008) for Finland and Glennerster (2006) and Adam and Browne (2010) for the United
Kingdom. In terms of cross-country studies, there are a number of papers that have investigated specific gov
ernment policies, such as the impact of social transfers in the EU by Heady et al. (2001). Other studies have
focused on the progressivity of the personal income tax (Peter et al., 2009; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2001,
Wagstaff et al., 1999). For previous multi-country comparative study see also Immervoll et al. (2006).
16. We do not take into account other dimensions of inequality broadly defined which are not measured by income.
17. Most studies in contrast have focused on the impact of individual income and social security taxes paid by em
ployees. The rationale to control for the impact of other taxes is that each of them has a different final eco
nomic incidence which is expected to affect the final distribution of income. Thus for example, the burden of
portion of social security taxes formally paid by employers is widely accepted falls on employees. Sometimes
it is argued that consumption taxes are excluded from the analysis because they do not have a direct impact of
income. However they do have a direct impact on the level of consumption and our measures of Gini also in
clude Gini measured based on consumption. The inclusion of corporate income taxes is also justified because
the final incidence of corporate income tax may be in lowered wages and labor income depending on the final
economic incidence of the CIT.
18. For example, public expenditures on health and education have the potential of increasing human capital of
lower income groups and therefore reduce income inequality.
19. If the time invariant country characteristics are correlated with the error term, these omitted variables can cre
ate an endogeneity bias. The measurement error bias is due to the fact that the progressivity index is after all
itself an estimated parameter with large or smaller standard errors. See Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008).
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20. The basic assumption is that tax progressivity in a country does not have an independent effect on the distri
bution of income in the neighboring countries, so the instrumental variable is expected to be uncorrelated with
the error term in the regression explaining inequality in the original country.
21. As we have seen some recent papers, such as Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) have examined the impact
of a one single tax, the PIT. Our results for progressivity are similar to those they obtain. However, in our re
gressions we anchor the progressivity index with the relative importance of PIT collections in GDP while Dun
can and Sabirianova Peter (2008) do not. But clearly the ability of a highly progressive PIT to redistribute income depends also on the size of its collections relative to GDP.
22. This question has been addressed by Bahl et al. (2002) at the state level in the United States.
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Resumen
El tema de atención principal de este artículo es analizar el papel potencial que tienen las políticas de
imposición y de gasto público para afectar a la distribución de la renta. Encontramos que los impuestos
sobre la renta progresivos y los impuestos de sociedades reducen la desigualdad de la renta. El efecto
de los impuestos sobre las sociedades parece disminuir significativamente en economías abiertas o
globalizadas. También encontramos como en general los impuestos sobre el consumo, abcisas e ingre
sos en aduanas tienen un impacto negativo sobre la distribución de la renta. Por el lado del gasto, en
contramos que mayores participaciones en términos del PIB del gasto público en bienestar social, ed
ucación, sanidad y vivienda tiene un impacto positivo sobre la distribución de la renta.
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